The Distributional Impact of a Carbon Tax in Ireland by Verde, Stefano & Tol, Richard S. J.
The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 40, No. 3, Autumn, 2009, pp. 317–338
POLICY PAPER




RICHARD S. J. TOL 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin and Vrije Universiteit,
Amsterdam
Abstract:  We study the effects of carbon taxation and revenue recycling across the income
distribution in Ireland. Price changes of fuels and all other final goods and services are taken into
account. If applied only to the emissions not covered by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, a
carbon tax of €20/tCO2 would cost the poorest households around €3.5/week and the richest ones
€5/week. The tax is regressive, therefore. However, if the revenue is used to increase social
benefits and tax credits, households across the income distribution can be made better off without
exhausting the total carbon tax revenue.
I INTRODUCTION
I
n 2006, Irish greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions were 25 per cent higher than
in 1990, that is, 11.5 percentage points above the Kyoto target (2008-2012).1
According to the government’s “National Climate Change Strategy 2007-
2012”, one fifth of this gap will be bridged through the purchase of carbon
credits, for which €290 million were allocated. Though there is reason to think
that the government underestimated the cost of compliance with Kyoto,2 the
main focus should be on the target set by the EU for 2020. Indeed, in twelve
years Ireland has to cut its emissions outside the EU Emissions Trading
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1 In 2007, emissions were about 10 percentage points above the Kyoto target (EPA, 2009a).
2 The latest projections of Irish emissions (EPA, 2009b) show that the distance from the Kyoto
target is close enough to what is indicated in the “National Climate Change Strategy 2007-2012”.
However, the government’s figures crucially do not take account of the current economic crisis.
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use of flexible mechanisms. Almost 60 per cent of the emissions from the non-
ETS sector are CO2 and the rest are methane (CH4), mostly from cattle.
Therefore, any strategy aimed at reducing these emissions should target both
CO2 and CH4. 
A carbon tax – or, more appropriately, a “CO2 tax”3 – is a charge to be paid
on every fossil fuel, proportional to the quantity of CO2 produced when it is
burnt. Hence, the higher the carbon content (per unit of energy) of a fuel, the
bigger its price increase. In principle, a carbon tax is the most cost-effective
instrument for reducing CO2 emissions (Piser, 1999; Nordhaus, 2005; Yohe et
al., 2007). In the specific instance, a carbon tax should: 1) apply only to the
non-ETS sector; and 2) be as close as possible to the ETS price of carbon 
(Tol, 2007). This is the case because: (1) if the tax was also levied on emissions
covered by the ETS, the cut on these would be offset by an equivalent increase
somewhere else in the EU (“carbon leakage”); and (2) the smaller the gap
between the tax and the ETS price of carbon, the smaller the welfare loss from
distortions in output markets (Bohringer et al., 2006). Such a tax would
effectively extend the ETS cap to all CO2 emissions and, most importantly,
thereby strengthen the carbon price signal. The tax assumed in the analysis
that follows has both characteristics. Specifically, a €20/tCO2 tax is considered
because that is the average price of carbon one may expect in the second ETS
trading period (2008-2012).   
In 2004, the Irish Government was close to levying a carbon tax, but
eventually abandoned the plan due to concerns about the potential impacts on
household income and firms’ international competitiveness – the two
arguments typically brought up against carbon taxes. Yet, only three years
later, the carbon levy again entered the agenda, following the strengthening of
EU climate policy and the Greens joining the Government. The “Programme
for Government 2007-2012” states that “(a)ppropriate fiscal instruments,
including a carbon levy, will be phased in on a revenue-neutral basis over the
lifetime of this Government”. The tax is not there yet, but Budget 2010 is most
likely to bring it in.
Any policy involving carbon pricing should include some measures to
sustain the households and firms most affected by higher energy prices. All
the more so in Ireland, where fuel poverty is a relevant issue (Scott et al.,
2008) and the economy is one of the most open in the world. As reported above,
the Government is supposed to phase in a carbon tax on a revenue-neutral
318 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
3 A CO2 tax is typically specified per metric tonne of CO2 emitted (€/tCO2). A tonne of carbon
corresponds to 3.67 tonnes of CO2. A carbon tax strictu sensu applies to other greenhouse gases as
well.
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unchanged, or net public spending will stay the same. The whole fiscal reform,
depending on existing taxes and distortions in the labour and capital markets,
will determine the ultimate outcome of the tax (Fullerton and Metcalf, 2001). 
This study focuses on the distributional implications of a €20/tCO2 tax in
Ireland. Microdata from the 2005 Household Budget Survey (HBS) are used to
estimate the burden of the levy across the population. In first place, the aim is
to establish whether a carbon tax would be regressive, that is, whether it
would hit the poor relatively more than the wealthy, and to what extent. The
model allows for the increases in both fuel prices and the general cost of living,
for which environmentally extended input-output analysis is used.
Subsequently, the results are combined with simulations of a most detailed
tax-benefit model – the SWITCH model of the Irish Economic and Social
Research Institute (ESRI) – to compare three tax revenue recycling options for
re-balancing the household income distribution. The scenarios envisaged
compound increases in income tax credit and welfare payments as well as a
cut in the lowest band income tax rate.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews the relevant
literature, with a focus on the studies that regard Ireland. Section III
illustrates the methodology and data used. Section IV shows the results.
Section V concludes. 
II LITERATURE  REVIEW
The impact of carbon/energy taxes on household income distribution has
been investigated in a number of studies. Most of these refer to developed
economies, where green taxation has been used, or at least considered, more
extensively and consumption of CO2 related fuels is more even across the
population, which fact is at the root of the equity problem. In fact, the
literature suggests that carbon/energy taxes generally are, or are expected to
be, regressive in developed economies and progressive in developing
economies.4
As concerns methodologies, partial equilibrium analysis is the standard
approach, although, in fact, the supply side is seldom considered. Data on
household consumption are used to model household demand and thereby
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4 This can be explained not only by the difference in household expenditure patterns. Shah and
Larsen (1992) argue that “… (in developing countries) factors such as market power, price
controls, import quotas, rationed foreign exchange, the presence of black markets, tax evasion and
urban-rural migration may cast doubt on the regressivity of environmental policies.” 
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confined to final demand of fuels, the “direct impact”, or include all goods and
services to capture the “indirect impact” too. In the latter case, environ  ment  -
ally extended input-output analysis generally is used, with the assumption
that the tax is fully translated into final prices. Moreover, among the most
recent works, there are few using computational general equilibrium (CGE)
models, with disaggregated households. These models enable wider analysis
and are best suited to assessing alternative revenue-recycling options.   
Among the earliest studies is one by Poterba (1991), who analyses the
distributional effect of a gasoline tax in the US. Using the data from the US
Consumer’s Expenditure Survey, Poterba (1991) calculates the fractions of
household income and expenditure that are devoted to gasoline purchase. He
concludes that the tax is only slightly regressive, especially when expressed as
a share of expenditure. On the other hand, Safirova et al. (2004) find that the
burden of congestion falls disproportionally on the rich (in and around
Washington, DC), so that road pricing or fuel taxation would be strongly
regressive.
With a view to the project of a European carbon tax, Pearson and Smith
(1991) estimate the distributional impact in seven European countries,
namely France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, the UK and Ireland.
Augmenting Poterba’s approach by including price elasticities (although they
do not estimate any demand system), they find that in the first five countries
the tax would be weakly regressive, while it would be significantly regressive
in the UK and strongly regressive in Ireland. Using a more comprehensive
model (the E3ME model, a sectoral, regionalised, econometric model of the
EU), Barker and Köhler (1998) upgrade Pearson and Smith’s work and draw
similar conclusions. 
Hamilton and Cameron (1994) estimate the distributional impact of a
carbon tax in Canada. By means of a CGE model, the authors first determine
the tax that would bring about a given cut in CO2 emissions; they then use
input-output analysis to translate the tax into all consumer prices and finally
apply a micro-simulation model to assess the impact of induced price changes.
It turns out that the tax would be moderately regressive. Similarly, Cornwell
and Creedy (1996) investigate the distributional impact of a carbon tax in
Australia. The combination of micro-data on household consumption and
input-output analysis suggests the tax would be regressive. 
A few more studies have been conducted with reference to European
economies. Labandeira and Labeaga (1999) explore the effect of a carbon tax
on Spanish household income. The authors use input-output analysis to
estimate price changes and then simulate consumer response via an Almost
Ideal Demand System (AIDS), estimated with data from the Spanish
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those previously mentioned, see Symons et al., 2000), they do not find that a
carbon tax in Spain would be regressive.
Tiezzi (2001) simulates the welfare effects of the carbon tax implemented
– de facto only for one year – in Italy in 1999. Such effects are calculated
combining True Cost of Living Indices and Compensating Variation; the
parameters are obtained through estimation of an AIDS with household
consumption data. The Italian carbon tax is found not to be regressive, since
it mainly hits motor fuels and less domestic fuels. Indeed, in developed
economies consumption of motor fuels typically increases with income while
that of domestic fuels is even across the population.
Brannlund and Nordstrom (2004) analyse welfare effects of changes in
green fiscal policy in Sweden, where a carbon tax was introduced in 1991.
They first estimate an econometric model for demand of non-durables 
(a quadratic AIDS), then assume a doubling of the existing tax and finally
compare two revenue-recycling options: lower general VAT and lower VAT on
public transport (equivalent to a subsidy to that sector). Both reforms end up
being regressive, but the second one also has a regional distributional effect,
as households in less populated areas would carry a larger share of the tax
burden. 
Wier et al. (2005) assess the distributional impact of the Danish carbon
tax, which was first introduced in 1992. The methodology is standard, but
nicely incorporates price changes and substitution effects induced by the tax.
The latter is found to be regressive, particularly to the disadvantage of rural
households. Still using standard methodology, Kerkhof et al. (2008) extend the
analysis to taxation of other GHGs – all those regulated under the Kyoto
Protocol – and find that multiple taxation not only improves the cost-
effectiveness of reducing emissions, but also distributes the tax burden more
equally across income groups as compared to a carbon tax on its own. This
contribution proves particularly relevant for Ireland, where CH4 accounts for
about one-third of total GHG emissions.
Results in the recent CGE literature confirm that the distributional
impact of a carbon tax crucially depends on how the revenue is used. In a
study applied to the Susquehanna River Basin (a region of the US), Oladosu
and Rose (2007) find that a carbon tax would be progressive, since changes in
the structure of the economy, higher transfer payments and reduced profits
more than offset the regressive direct effects. Yusuf and Resosudamo (2007)
find that a carbon tax on its own would be progressive in Indonesia and
revenue-recycling through uniform cut in commodity tax rate would reduce
the adverse effect on GDP. Particularly encouraging are the results of a study
applied to South Africa, as Van Heerden et al. (2006) find a “triple dividend”
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reduced food taxes reduce emissions, increase economic output, and reduce the
income gap between rich and poor.
Finally, there are at least five studies addressing the distributional effects
of a carbon tax with specific reference to Ireland. On the basis of data from the
Irish Household Budget Survey (HBS), Scott (1992) predicts that a carbon tax
would be markedly regressive in Ireland, because low income households both
spend disproportionately more on energy and generally use fuels with higher
carbon contents. Scott and Eakins (2004) essentially repeat the work with
more recent data and get similar results. O’Donoghue (1997) estimates both
direct and indirect impacts, by using HBS and input-output analysis, and it
turns out that the tax burden would be borne more equally by households once
the indirect impact is taken into account too. Bergin et al. (2004) use an
energy-augmented macro-econometric model (ESRI’s HERMES model) to
forecast energy demand and emissions, with carbon taxation. In relation to the
equity issue, the authors argue that reducing VAT through tax revenue-
recycling is better than by giving households lump-sum payments because it
would affect competitiveness less. Callan et al. (2009) use more recent data
than do Scott and Eakins, and combine estimated carbon tax payments with
ESRI’s micro-simulation tax-benefit model (the SWITCH model) to compare a
few revenue-recycling options. They find that a carbon tax on its own would be
regressive, as expected, and the preferable way to compensate households
would be through modest increases in both welfare payments and tax credit.
Note that the paper by Callan et al., is in the essence, very similar to the
present one. However, the current paper also estimates the indirect impact of
the tax,5 something that Callan et al., did not.
III METHODOLOGY  AND  DATA
Like the standard literature, this study distinguishes between direct and
indirect impacts of carbon taxation on household income. The direct impact is
here defined as the increase in fuel expenditure due to higher fuel prices, as
opposed to the indirect impact, which is the increase in total expenditure (all
goods and services but fuels) induced by higher fuel prices. Microdata from the
2005 HBS are used to estimate the two impacts across the household
population. However, estimation of the change in the cost of living also
322 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
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but using older and aggregated (decile level) household consumption data. Also, he does not deal
with revenue recycling. 
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emissions. The resulting changes in the household income distribution are
then combined with simulations of the SWITCH tax-benefit model to evaluate
three alternative tax revenue recycling options. Note that all population
estimates based on the HBS are obtained by applying HBS household specific
grossing-up factors. Also, the SWITCH model automatically grosses-up the
survey data it is based on. 
There follows a detailed illustration of the three-step analysis sketched:
direct impact of the tax, indirect impact and revenue recycling. 
3.1 Estimating the Direct Impact
Microdata from the 2005 HBS (CSO, 2007) are used to calculate household
fuel consumption and related CO2 emissions. The fuels included in the HBS
are considered either “home fuels” (gas, electricity, anthracite, coal, turf, turf
briquettes, central heating oil, paraffin oil and LPG) or “motor fuels” (petrol,
diesel and LPG auto). Since only expenditure on motor fuels is reported in the
HBS, quantities of petrol, diesel and LPG auto are derived dividing
expenditure by price.6 Thus, for each household in the sample, weekly fuel
quantities are translated into energy (Tonnes of Oil Equivalent (TOE)) and, in
turn, into weekly CO2 emissions, by using standard calorific values and
emission coefficients7 respectively. Finally, weekly8 tax payments are
estimated by applying the assumed €20/tCO2 tax to emissions so derived.
The method hinges on two important but standard assumptions: (1) fuel
prices increase by an amount equal to the tax (i.e. producers entirely shift the
tax onto the consumer); (2) consumers do not switch to cleaner fuels when the
tax is levied (i.e. zero demand price elasticities). However, we know that in
reality the tax pass-through depends on the specific market structures, which
are not investigated in this study. Also, we know zero price elasticities are
plausible in the very short run, but not over a longer horizon. In light of that,
the estimation results can best be interpreted either as first round effects or
the “worst case” for consumers.
3.2 Estimating the Indirect Impact
The same HBS dataset is used to calculate household consumption of all
goods and services other than fuels. However, standard emission coefficients
for general consumption do not exist and, hence, have to be derived. O’Doherty
THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF A CARBON TAX IN IRELAND 323
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source for data of fuel prices are Sustainable Energy Ireland (petrol and diesel) and Flogas (for
LPG auto).   
7 Calorific values and emission coefficients used are reported in Table A1, in the Appendix. 
8 In the HBS, consumption data are by week. In fact, they are averages over two successive weeks.
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In the standard input-output model, with i = 1,2,…,n output sectors and j
= 1,2,…,n input sectors, production X depends on final demand Y, through the
Leontief matrix L:  
X = (I – A)–1 Y = LY (1)
where A is the matrix aij = Xij/Xj .  
If sectoral CO2 emissions (allocated by gas production) are given, a model
for total emissions M depending on final demand is obtained by first defining 
M = BX (2)
where B is the vector of “production coefficients”, that is, emissions per unit of
production (grams/€), and then combining (2) with (1)  
M=BLY (3)
where  BL is therefore the vector of “consumption coefficients”, that is,
emission per unit of consumption (grams/€). 
Ireland’s 2005 input-output table (CSO, 2009) is used. The model
comprises 19 NACE9 sectors (NACE19) because this is the the most
disaggregated level for which data of sectoral output and emissions are both
available. The NACE19 classification is the following: 
1. Agriculture, fishing and forestry
2. Coal, peat, petroleum, metal ores and quarrying
3. Food, beverage and tobacco
4. Textiles clothing leather and footwear
5. Wood and wood products
6. Pulp, paper and print prod.
7. Chemical prod.
8. Rubber and plastic prod.
9. Non-metallic mineral prod.
10. Metal prod. excl. machinery and transport equipment
11. Agricultural and industrial machinery
12. Office and data process machines
13. Electrical goods
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15. Other manufacturing
16. Fuel, power and water
17. Construction
18. Services (excl. transport) 
19. Transport
Production coefficients are calculated using data of sectoral emissions and
output published by EPA (2009a) and CS0 (2009), respectively. Subsequently,
in order to apply the derived consumption coefficients10 to HBS demand, the
HBS code has to be mapped into NACE19.11 With the consumption microdata
(all goods and services but fuels) aggregated in 19 categories, the
corresponding consumption coefficients are applied. The indirect impact of the
tax is then estimated multiplying the €20/tCO2 rate by the emissions so
derived. At this point, two remarks are needed. First, since most probably only
domestic production would be subject to the carbon levy and since the HBS
does not specify the origin of the goods and services purchased, consumption
coefficients only apply to the share of household demand which is satisfied by
domestic production. For example, since 20 per cent of “Rubber and plastic”
demanded by households is imported, the corresponding consumption
coefficient applies only to 80 per cent of HBS households’ expenditures on
“Rubber and plastic”.12 Second, since it is assumed the tax will apply only to
the non-ETS sector, the emissions from the activities covered by the EU ETS
should not be considered in the determination of the indirect impact of the tax.
To take account of this, production coefficients of the sectors corresponding to
the EU ETS activities (i.e. 6, 9, 10 and 16 in NACE19) are set equal to zero.    
Finally, the method for estimating the indirect impact of the tax is based
on a few relevant assumptions: 1) all producers shift the tax downhill, which
implies the consumer bears the whole burden of the tax; 2) producers do not
switch to less carbon intensive fuels after the tax is levied (i.e. zero supply
price elasticities); and 3) consumers do not substitute domestic with imported
products (i.e. zero demand price elasticities). Thus, again, in light of these
restrictions, the estimation results can best be interpreted either as first
round effects or the worst possible scenario for consumers.
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authors.
12 The shares of imports on final household demand, by NACE19 sector, are reported in Table A3,
in the Appendix.
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The SWITCH model is regularly used by the Department of Finance for
distributional analysis of the impact of the annual budget. It is a model of
direct taxes and welfare payments, based on the Survey on Income and Living
Conditions (EU SILC, CSO, 2006) – a nationally representative survey
capturing the variability in the household population across age, household
composition, income, employment, and disability. Here, it is used to analyse
the distributional implications of tax revenue recycling. 
Income taxes in Ireland are relatively straightforward. A 20 per cent tax is
paid on income below €35,400 per year. Above that, a tax of 41 per cent is paid.
There is a standard tax credit of €3,660, so that the first €18,300 earned is
essentially tax-free. There are additional tax credits for mortgage and rent, for
family circumstances, and for disabilities. The Irish benefit system is
considerably more complex, with income supplements, child benefits,
maternity and homemaker benefits, carers benefits, illness and disability
benefits, jobseeker and training benefits, pre-retirement allowances and
pensions; many of these benefits come in both an entitlement and a means-
tested mode. 
The SWITCH model is used to simulate three revenue-recycling options.
Specifically, both the first and second scenarios involve a €2 increase per week
in all social welfare payments (pensions, unemployment compensation, short-
term illness and long-term disability, one parent families) and a €104 increase
per year in basic personal tax credit. The second scenario only differs for one
additional measure, namely a €0.8 payment per week for each qualifying child
of a social welfare recipient. The third scenario hinges on income taxation. It
still provides for the €2 increase in all social welfare payments, which is
obviously a measure for reaching low income households, and adds a half
percentage point cut of the lowest band income tax rate, that is, from 20 per
cent to 19.5 per cent.
IV RESULTS
4.1 Direct Impact
It emerges from the data that emissions associated with energy
consumption for heating and cooking (home fuels) are virtually constant
across the household population. Hence, the same pattern is derived for the
related tax payments. Conversely, emissions caused by private transport are
increasing with income and, again, the same pattern must apply for the tax
payments on consumption of motor fuels. The overall direct impact of the tax
is estimated to range across the household distribution between €3 and €4 per
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(Figure 1).
Figure 1: The Direct Impact of the Tax
Note that: (1) emissions and related tax payments for electricity
consumption are not considered; and (2) households are sorted by equivalised
disposable income.13 This is the case because: (1) electricity generation is
regulated under the EU ETS and price increases of electricity have already
been included in the relevant price indices that are used for setting benefits
and in wage negotiations; and (2) equivalised disposable income is deemed a
better measure of real wealth.
HBS data on energy consumption at home (electricity included) also reveal
some facts that are relevant for climate policy and, hence, worth pointing out
here. Equivalised energy consumption, measured by “TOE per adult
equivalent”, is lower for the middle deciles and higher at the edges of the
household income distribution. One may assume that this is so because
dwellings of low income households are not well insulated, while high income
households use more energy and do it more efficiently too (O’Doherty et al.,
2008). This hypothesis seems to be supported by the fact that, for low income
deciles, the percentage of dwellings with double glazing is negatively
correlated with energy consumption.14 Moreover, as stressed in previous
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Breakdown of direct carbon tax (€20/TonneCO2)
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13 Equivalisation corrects for the size of households by expressing household income as income per
adult equivalent. The weights used are: “head of household” = 1; “other adults” = .66; “children
(<14)” = .33. 
14 Unfortunately, data on roof-insulation are not available in the HBS. 
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cheaper but more carbon intensive fuels, such as coal and turf. The ratio
“Emissions per TOE”, measuring the carbon intensity of a mix of fuels, indeed
is found to be strongly correlated with income. It so happens that (equivalised)
emissions due to heating and cooking are exactly the same for the first and
tenth deciles, but energy consumption is higher in the latter. Figures (weekly
energy and emissions data) are reported in Table 1. 
Table 1: Home Energy Consumption and Double Glazing; Home Fuels Carbon
Intensity and CO2 Emissions
Income Energy Efficiency Fuels Emissions Emissions
Decile TOE eq. Double Glazing (%) tCO2/TOE tCO2, Equivalised tCO2
1 .022 67 4.50 .091 .161
2 .029 60 4.51 .115 .163
3 .026 66 4.37 .103 .170
4 .020 75 4.37 .081 .171
5 .020 77 4.40 .082 .175
6 .021 79 4.21 .084 .177
7 .021 82 4.17 .084 .175
8 .022 83 4.21 .082 .169
9 .024 84 4.15 .092 .168
10 .025 82 4.01 .091 .158
Thus, poor insulation and more extensive use of carbon intensive fuels
seem to explain why, at home, low income households are responsible for as
much, or slightly more, emissions as high income households. However,
variability within deciles is quite high. Further investigation with the use of
econometrics could certainly reveal more about the relations highlighted, but
that would be beyond the scope of this study.
4.2 Indirect Impact
As expected, the indirect impact of the tax turns out to be increasing with
the level of income. Specifically, under the assumption that a €20/Ton of CO2
tax is levied only in the non-ETS sector, and not on imports, the burden of the
tax sums to less than €0.5 per week for the first decile and rises up to €1.5 for
the tenth. However, if the tax is made to apply to imports as well,15 the cost of
living increases more significantly along the household income distribution
328 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
15 Note that, in fact, if the tax was levied on imports too, the price of carbon in the exporting
country would be considered (i.e. a €20 rate would be applied only to imports from countries where
the price of carbon is zero, whereas a lower rate would be applied to imports from a country where
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responsible for substantial (relative to domestic) CO2 emissions abroad.
Similar results are obtained if the tax is levied in the ETS sector too, but not
on imports. Finally, the increase in the cost of living is substantially higher
(three times as much as in the first scenario), if the tax applies to both the ETS
sector and imports. Figure 2 shows these results. 
Figure 2: The Indirect Impact of the Tax Under Three Different Scenarios
Figure 3 shows the overall impact of the tax, given by the sum of direct
and indirect impacts, under the assumption that the tax applies neither to the
ETS sector nor to imports. As argued previously, the latter scenario is indeed
the most likely and recommendable for Ireland.  
Figure 3: The Overall Impact of the Tax
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The regressiveness of the tax here is measured as the ratio between
estimated tax payments and household disposable income. In line with the
literature specific to Ireland, the carbon tax is markedly regressive as
expected: the impact in the first decile is seven times as big as that in the
tenth decile (see Figure 4). Behind this result is the pattern of direct energy
consumption, which is virtually flat across the income distribution.16
Figure 4: Tax Regressiveness
Most important, average tax payments exceed 2 per cent of disposable
income for the poorest decile. Also, variability within the first decile is very
high (the coefficient of variation is four times bigger than in the other deciles)
and the distribution strongly skewed: only 24 per cent of households in the
decile have an impact higher than the decile average. This implies that 2.4 per
cent of Irish households would suffer an impact higher than 2 per cent, and,
in fact, some of them would suffer impacts way higher than that. Yet, a more
careful look at the data reveals that errors in income data are most likely, at
least for some of the observations with extremely high impact.   
4.4 Recycling the Revenue
Figure 5 compares the average net gains associated with the three
revenue recycling options considered in this study, when allowing for the
compensation of the direct impact only. In the first scenario, the increase in
social welfare payments benefits households in the lower deciles, whereas the
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16 Interestingly, Wier Molly. (2005) find very similar results for Denmark, though less regressive
overall.
04 Tol article_ESRI Vol 40  10/09/2009  13:01  Page 330increased tax credit benefits households in the upper half. Net gains are
minimal for deciles 1 (in fact, no gain), 4 and 10. The second option, or
scenario, only adds an increase in the qualified child allowance for social
welfare recipients, which fact has clear benefits for the lower incomes. As for
the third option, i.e. higher benefits and lower tax rate, there are relevant
gains across the income distribution, but minimal ones for deciles 1 and 4.
Rich households definitely gain more under this scenario.
Figure 5: Tax Revenue Recycling: Compensating the Direct Impact of the Tax
No doubt, the second scenario is preferable: it improves the first one,
which generates negative gains for the first decile, while distributing gains
over the deciles more equitably than the third. Moreover, the cost of the second
scenario would be €360 million, as compared to €423 million for the third
scenario. Conefrey et al. (2008) estimate a €20/tCO2 tax to generate, in 2010,
a revenue stream of about €550 million from the non-ETS sector.17 Therefore,
under the second scenario, there would be a substantial amount of money left
over after households’ compensation (€190 million).
Should the government compensate households for the indirect impact of
the tax too? Arguably, it should not. The indirect impact, as previously defined,
is largely felt as a general increase in prices, which fact has two types of
implications: (1) it is supposed to be included already in inflation adjustments
of benefits and wages; (2) compensation for the indirect impact would not drive
consumer behaviour towards less carbon intensive consumption anyway.
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17 Note that the €550 million estimate allows for the substitution effects induced by the tax.
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compensation of the higher cost of living is actually used for other purposes.
Yet, it is still interesting to compare our three revenue recycling options once
again, this time allowing for the indirect impact of the tax as well (Figure 6).
Note that the latter refers to the case the tax is levied only in the non-ETS
sector, and not on imports: net gains are somewhat lower if tax is levied also
in the ETS sector and/or on imports.    
Figure 6: Tax Revenue Recycling: Compensating the Indirect Impact Too
Most importantly, 55,000 households (equivalent to 3.8 per cent of the
total), according to the SWITCH estimates, would not be assisted by the
tax/welfare compensation packages here considered. Some of these households
would be households with a low self-employment income, subject neither to
tax nor eligible for social welfare payments. This is a very serious issue, which,
if anything, should be solved for other reasons than climate policy.
V CONCLUSIONS
In view of the emissions target for 2020, Ireland needs major cuts in GHG
emissions from the non-ETS sector. Accordingly, the government is supposed
to introduce a carbon tax, which: (1) would be revenue-neutral; (2) should be
levied only in the non-ETS sector; and (3) should be close to EU ETS price of
carbon. This paper analyses the distributional implications of a €20/tCO2 tax
with such characteristics. 
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week, per household, across the household population. In line with findings of
previous work on Ireland, household energy consumption for heating and
cooking is virtually constant across the household population, while
consumption of motor fuels is positively related to income. Importantly, there
is evidence that, at home, low income households are less energy efficient and
rely more on carbon intensive fuels (both facts result in higher tax payments).
Besides, note that emissions from Transport and Residential sectors have been
growing faster than in the other sectors of the economy over the last few years.
That is why a carbon tax in the non-ETS sector is needed. 
The indirect impact of the tax is estimated to range between €0.5 and €1.5
per week, per household, across the household population. Since the indirect
impact relates to consumption of all goods and services but fuels, it is
increasing with income. The increase in the cost of living would be more
significant, though still limited, if the tax was applied to imports and/or the
ETS sector. However, both circumstances are most unlikely, as taxing imports
from countries with more loose carbon restrictions would be technically
difficult and levying the tax in the ETS sector is not expedient (carbon
leakage). 
The overall impact of the carbon tax is markedly regressive, as the average
burden is an estimated 2.1 per cent of disposable income for the first decile,
1.2 per cent for the second decile and 0.3 per cent for the tenth decile. Yet, the
impact distribution is strongly skewed within the first decile, which fact
implies the burden would be smaller than 2.1 per cent for most of the
households in the decile and much higher than that for a few households
(though still a significant number). Moreover, a few of the observations with
highest impacts are found to have spurious income values (making the impact
huge) and the tax would probably be less regressive if compared to
consumption rather than disposable income.       
Three alternative welfare/tax packages for compensating households were
simulated. A €2 increase per week in all welfare payments, a €104 increase per
year in tax credit and a €0.8 payment per week for each child of social welfare
recipients, turns out to be the mix of measures distributing net gains most
equitably, while leaving over substantial resources to finance other pro  -
grammes. Specifically, some €190 million would be left over and one may
consider it only costs about €1,000 to install attic or wall cavity insulation in
a home (Ryan et al., 2008).    
Overall, the results of this study suggest that distributional concerns
should not deter the introduction of a carbon tax in Ireland. Above all, it
should be emphasised that all estimates of the tax impact on household
income are conservative because the methodology used allows for substitution
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burden of the tax is entirely borne by consumers too. Yet, even so, on average
households are better off after revenue recycling and substantial resources are
left over too. Also, low income households have wider margins for carbon
reductions, to be achieved through the use of less carbon intensive fuels and
energy efficiency. 
The levy of a carbon tax may have further distributional implications
through the labour market. Therefore, the use of a general equilibrium
approach is a necessary extension of the present study. A general equilibrium
approach would also enable the analysis of the tax impact on other relevant
economic measures, such as economic growth and international competitive  -
ness. In relation to the latter, the restrictions on CO2 put in place in Ireland’s
most important trading partners should be taken into account as well.  
REFERENCES
BARKER, T. and J. KÖHLER, 1998. “Equity and Ecotax Reform in the EU: Achieving
a 10 per cent Reduction in CO2 Emissions Using Excise Duties”, Fiscal Studies,
Vol. 19, pp. 375-402. 
BERGIN, A., J. FITZ GERALD and I. KEARNEY, 2004. “The Macro-Economic Effects
of Using Fiscal Instruments to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions”, Environ  -
mental Protection Agency, Wexford (Ireland). 
BOHRINGER, C., T. HOFFMAN and C. MANRIQUE-DE-LARA-PENATE, 2006. “The
Efficiency Costs of Separating Carbon Markets Under the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme: A Quantitative Assessment for Germany”, Energy Economics, Vol. 28, pp.
44-61. 
BRANNLUND, R. and J. NORDSTROM, 2004. “Carbon Tax Simulations Using a
Household Demand Model”, European Economic Review, Vol. 48, pp. 211-233.
CALLAN, T., S. LYONS, S. SCOTT, R.  S.  J. TOL and S. VERDE, 2009. “The
Distributional Implications of a Carbon Tax in Ireland”, Energy Policy, Elsevier,
Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 407-412.
CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE, 2006. “EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions
(EU SILC) 2005”, Cork: Central Statistics Office.
CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE, 2007. “Household Budget Survey 2004-2005
Microdata File”, Cork: Central Statistics Office.
CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE, 2009. “2005 Supply and Use and Input-Output
Tables”, Cork: Central Statistics Office.
CONEFREY, T., J. D. FITZ GERALD, L. MALAGUZZI VALERI and R. S. J. TOL, 2008.
“The Impact of a Carbon Tax on Economic Growth and Carbon Dioxide Emissions
in Ireland”, Working Paper No. 251, Economic and Social Research Institute,
Dublin.
CORNWELL, A. and J. CREEDY, 1996. “Carbon Taxation, Prices and Inequality in
Australia”, Fiscal Studies, Vol. 17, pp. 21-38.
EPA, 2009a. “Ireland’s National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventory for 2007”,
Wexford: Environmental Protection Agency.
334 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
04 Tol article_ESRI Vol 40  10/09/2009  13:01  Page 334EPA, 2009b. “Ireland’s Greenhouse Gas Emission Projections 2008-2020”, Wexford:
Environ  mental Protection Agency.
FULLERTON, F. and G. METCALF, 2001. “Environmental Controls, Scarcity Rents,
and Pre-Existing Distortions”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 80, pp. 249-267.
HAMILTON, K. and G. CAMERON, 1994. “Simulating the Distributional Effects of a
Canadian Carbon Tax”, Canadian Public Policy, Vol. 20, pp. 385-399.
KERKHOF, A. C., H. C. MOLL, E. DRISSEN and H. C. WILTING, 2008. “Taxation of
Multiple Greenhouse Gases and the Effects on Income Distribution – A Case Study
of the Netherlands”, Ecological Economics, Vol. 67, pp. 318-326.
LABANDEIRA, X. and J. LABEAGA, 1999. “Combining Input-Output Analysis and
Micro-Simulation to Assess the Effects of Carbon Taxation on Spanish
Households”, Fiscal Studies, Vol. 20, pp. 305-320.
NORDHAUS, W. D., 2005. “Life After Kyoto: Alternative Approaches to Global
Warming Policies”, NBER Working Papers No.11889. 
O’DOHERTY, J. and R. S. J. TOL, 2007. “An Environmental Input-Output Model for
Ireland”, The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 157-190.
O’DOHERTY, J., S. LYONS and R.S.J. TOL, 2008. “Energy-Using Appliances and
Energy-Savings Features: Determinants of Ownership in Ireland”, Applied
Energy, Vol. 85, pp. 650-662.
O’DONOGHUE, C., 1997. “Carbon Dioxide, Energy Taxes, and Household Income”,
Working Paper No.90, Dublin: Economic and Social Research Institute.
OLADOSU, G. and A. ROSE, 2007. “Income Distribution Impacts of Climate Change
Mitigation Policy in the Susquehanna River Basin Economy”, Energy Economics,
Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 520-544.
PEARSON, M. and S. SMITH, 1991. “The European Carbon Tax: an Assessment of the
European Commission’s Proposals”, London: The Institute for Fiscal Studies.
PIZER, W. A., 1999. “The Optimal Choice of Climate Change Policy in the Presence of
Uncertainty”, Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. 21, pp. 255-287.
POTERBA, J. M., 1991. “Is the Gasoline Tax Regressive?”, NBER Working Papers No.
3578.
RYAN, L., F. CONVERY and N. CASSERLY, 2008. “Mobilising Market-Based
Instrument for Climate Change in Ireland”, in Research Series No.4, Budget
Perspectives 2009. Dublin: Economic and Social Research Institute.
SAFIROVA, E., K. GILLINGHAM, I. PARRY, P. NELSON, W. HARRINGTON and D.
MASON, 2004. ‘Welfare and Distributional Effects of Road Pricing Schemes for
Metropolitan Washington DC’, Research in Transport Economics, Vol. 9, pp. 179-
206.
SCOTT, S., 1992. “Theoretical Considerations and Estimates of the Effects on
Households” in J. D. Fitz Gerald and D. McCoy (eds.), The Economic Effects of
Carbon Taxes, Policy Research Paper 14, Dublin: Economic and Social Research
Institute, .
SCOTT, S. and J. EAKINS, 2004. “Carbon Taxes: Which Households Gain or Lose?”,
ERTDI Report Series 20, Wexford: Environmental Protection Agency, Johnstown
Castle.
SCOTT, S., S. LYONS, C. KEANE, D. MCCARTHY and R. S. J. TOL, 2008. “Fuel
Poverty in Ireland: Extent, Affected Groups and Policy Issues”, ESRI, Working
Paper No.262.
THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF A CARBON TAX IN IRELAND 335
04 Tol article_ESRI Vol 40  10/09/2009  13:01  Page 335SHAH, A. and B. LARSEN, 1992. “Carbon Taxes, the Greenhouse Effect, and
Developing Countries”, Policy Research Working Paper Series 957, Washington:
The World Bank.
SYMONS, E. J., S. SPECK and J. L. R. PROOPS, 2000. “The Effects of Pollution and
Energy Taxes across the European Income Distribution”, Keele Department of
Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 2000/05, Department of Economics,
Keele University. 
TIEZZI, S., 2001. “The Welfare Effects of Carbon Taxation on Italian Households”,
Working Paper 337, Dipartimento di Economica Politica, Universita’ degli Studi di
Siena.
TOL, R. S. J., 2007. “Irish Climate Policy for 2012: An Assessment”, ESRI Quarterly
Economic Commentary, Winter 2007, pp. 104-117. Dublin: Economic and Social
Research Institute.
VAN HEERDEN, J., R. GERLAGH, J. BLIGNAUT, M. HORRIDGE, S. HESS, R.
MABUGU and M. MABUGU, 2006. “Searching for Triple Dividends in South
Africa: Fighting CO2 Pollution and Poverty While Promoting Growth”, The Energy
Journal, Vol. 27, pp. 113-141.
WIER, M., K. BIRR-PEDERSEN, H. K. JACOBSEN and J. KLOK, 2005. “Are CO2
Taxes Regressive? Evidence from the Danish Experience”, Ecological Economics,
Vol. 52, pp. 239-251.
YOHE, G., R. S. J. TOL and D. MURPHY, 2007. “On Setting Near-Term Climate Policy
While the Dust Begins to Settle: The Legacy of the Stern Review”, Energy and
Environment, Vol. 18, No. 5. 
YUSUF, A. A. and B. RESOSUDARMO, 2007. “On the Distributional Effect of Carbon
Tax in Developing Countries: The Case of Indonesia”, Working Paper in Economics
and Development Studies No.200705, Department of Economics, Padjadjaran
University.
336 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
04 Tol article_ESRI Vol 40  10/09/2009  13:01  Page 336APPENDIX
Table A1: Calorific Values and Emission Coefficients
Fuel HBS  Calorific Value Emission Coefficient 
Measure (TOE) (tCO2/TOE)
Gas Kwh .000086 2.378
Electricity Kwh .000086 7.402 (year 2006)
Anthracite Kg .000665 4.110
Coal Kg .000665 3.961
Turf Loose Cwt .015907 4.354
Turf Briquettes Bale .005538 4.137
Central Heating Oil Litre .000868 3.050
Paraffin Oil Pint .000473 2.980
LPG Kg .001126 2.667
Petrol Litre .000804 2.931
Diesel Litre .000874 3.050
LPG auto Litre .000563 2.670
Table A2: 2005 Production and Consumption Coefficients (Grams/€)
NACE19  With Tax in the ETS  Without Tax in the ETS
sector Production  Consumption Production  Consumption 
1 120 293 120 184
2 41 170 41 77
3 65 285 65 173
4 176 309 176 224
54 9 5 2 4 9 5 1
66 3 3 0 9
71 8 2 9 1 8 2 1
8 32 760 32 191
9 1925 2105 0 44
10 572 1035 0 68
11 35 213 35 73
12 16 38 16 21
13 13 89 13 43
14 31 409 31 122
15 179 304 179 234
16 3436 4429 0 23
17 11 14 11 11
18 14 129 14 53
19 1047 1319 1047 1200
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